BEGIN:VCALENDAR
VERSION:2.0
PRODID:-//132.216.98.100//NONSGML kigkonsult.se iCalcreator 2.20.4//
BEGIN:VEVENT
UID:20251016T021645EDT-3693vl5kW6@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20251016T061645Z
DESCRIPTION:'Optimal Disclosure of Information to Privately Informed Agents
 '\n\nOzan Candogan (Chicago Booth)\n\nMarch 17\, 2023\, 3:30 to 5:00 PM\n	L
 eacock 429\n\nHost: Leonie Baumann\n	Field: Theory\n\nAbstract: We study in
 formation design when there are multiple agents interacting in a game who 
 are privately informed about their types. Each agent’s utility depends on 
 all agents’ types and actions\, as well as (linearly) on the state. The op
 timal mechanism asks agents to report their types and then sends a private
  action recommendation to each agent which depends on all reported types a
 nd the state. We show that there always exists an optimal mechanism which 
 is laminar partitional. Such a mechanism partitions the state space for ea
 ch type profile and recommends the same action profile for states that bel
 ong to the same partition element. Furthermore\, the convex hulls of any t
 wo partition elements are such that either one contains the other or they 
 have an empty intersection. In the single-agent case\, each state is eithe
 r perfectly revealed or lies in an interval in which the number of differe
 nt signal realizations is at most the number of different types of the age
 nt plus two. A similar result is established for the multi-agent case. We 
 also highlight the value of screening: without screening the best achievab
 le payoff could be as low as one over the number of types fraction of the 
 optimal payoff. Along the way\, we shed light on the solutions of optimiza
 tion problems over distributions subject to a mean-preserving contraction 
 constraint and additional side constraints\, which might be of independent
  interest.\n
DTSTART:20230317T193000Z
DTEND:20230317T210000Z
LOCATION:Room 429\, Leacock Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 2T7\, 855 r
 ue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:Ozan Candogan (Chicago Booth)\, 'Optimal Disclosure of Information 
 to Privately Informed Agents'
URL:/economics/channels/event/ozan-candogan-chicago-bo
 oth-optimal-disclosure-information-privately-informed-agents-340873
END:VEVENT
END:VCALENDAR