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UID:20251017T043839EDT-7878f9KXF7@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20251017T083839Z
DESCRIPTION:Management Science Research Centre presents:\n'Demand Informati
 on and Spot Price Information: Supply Chains Trading in Spot Markets'\nXua
 n Zhao\, Associate Professor in the School of Business and Economics\, Wil
 frid Laurier University\nAbstract:\nThis paper studies the effect of infor
 mation updating (in both the demand and the spot price) on the members of 
 a two-stage supply chain in the presence of spot market. The supplier firs
 t decides the wholesale price. As time progresses\, new information become
 s available. The manufacturer updates his belief on demand or (and) spot p
 rice\, and then decides the contract quantity. Due to the correlation betw
 een demand and spot price\, the new demand information also updates the be
 lief on the spot price\, and vice versa. Using a novel method to obtain th
 e posterior bivariate normal distributions\, we model the problem with inf
 ormation updating Stackelberg game and derive the unique equilibrium strat
 egies. We then obtain the condition under which the supplier and the manuf
 acturer intend to use a forward contract. Our study shows that improved de
 mand information benefits both the supplier and the manufacturer if the co
 rrelation coefficient between the two uncertainties has a small positive v
 alue\, and hurts the supplier otherwise. However\, superior spot price inf
 ormation only benefits the manufacturer and always hurts the supplier. As 
 to which type of information updating facility/expertise to invest in (due
  to for example financial constraint)\, our finding suggests that the dema
 nd information updating leads to a win-win solution if the manufacturer is
  moderately risk-averse\, or if the manufacturer is sufficiently risk-aver
 se and a good forecaster. For a less risk-averse manufacturer\, or suffici
 ently risk-averse manufacturer with bad forecasting capability\, an agreem
 ent is never achieved. Literature in this field has focused on demand info
 rmation only\; this paper provides a more complete picture on the impact o
 f asymmetric market information to supply chains.\nA light lunch will be s
 erved
DTSTART:20130906T150000Z
DTEND:20130906T170000Z
LOCATION:Room 245\, Bronfman Building\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1G5\, 1001
  rue Sherbrooke Ouest
SUMMARY:'Demand Information and Spot Price Information: Supply Chains Tradi
 ng in Spot Markets' - Xuan Zhao
URL:/desautels/channels/event/demand-information-and-s
 pot-price-information-supply-chains-trading-spot-markets-xuan
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