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UID:20251219T051457EST-1158nSRJPR@132.216.98.100
DTSTAMP:20251219T101457Z
DESCRIPTION:SPEAKERS\nMichel\nAlbouy\, Université Pierre Mendès France\, Gr
 enoble \nThe\nHon. Mary K. Bush\, Bush International \nJean-François Gasco
 n\, V-P Capacity Building\,\nSNC-Lavalin \n\nJean-François Gaudreault-DesB
 iens\, Faculté de droit\, Université\nde Montréal \nRichard Janda\,\nMcGil
 l Faculty of Law \nPierre-Emmanuel\nMoyse\, 9IÖÆ×÷³§Ãâ·Ñ Faculty of Law \n\nStép
 hane Rousseau\, Faculté de droit\, Université de Montréal\nBACKGROUND\nMuc
 h has been written and said about salaries and bonuses\nreceived by execut
 ives. No doubt the current crisis stigmatizes a\nnumber of practices desig
 ned to reward performance and to align\ncompensation with the mighty objec
 tive of profit maximization for\ncorporations: they give way to excess. Th
 e demise of Enron and of\nLehman Brothers\, the revelations that followed\
 , the fraudulent use\nof accounting mechanisms\, the dubious role of lawye
 rs and advisers\n- all place the issue of compensation at the very heart o
 f a\nnecessary review of corporate governance. Executives and\nprofessiona
 l advisers - including lawyers - are under surveillance\nand the law is on
 e instrument through which the state may take\naction.\nModern compensatio
 n schemes have long reflected the prevailing\nlegal school of thought on t
 he goal and nature of the corporation\,\none grounded in legal\, economic 
 and political literature derived\nfrom the Chicago School. Within this tra
 dition\, corporate\ngovernance is examined through the lens of cost-effici
 ency\nmechanisms\, in isolation or to the exclusion of other parameters.\n
 This view is still predominant today. Many scholars in law and\neconomics 
 still continue to ignore studies of corporate governance\nthat do not deal
  with economic performance (e.g. social and ethical\napproaches of directo
 r remuneration).\nOnce the basic premise of profit maximization is challen
 ged\, the\nprevalent justification for compensation becomes questionable. 
 The\nexercise cannot consist only of aligning the company's performance\nw
 ith remuneration. Even if we assume this apportionment method to\nbe desir
 able\, it does not accurately reflect the practice of\ncompensation and bo
 nuses. Recent legal cases and management\nliterature clearly demonstrate t
 he frequent disconnect between\nsenior executive compensation and a compan
 y's financial\nperformance.\nThis conference will explore the theoretical 
 and practical\njustifications underlying executive compensation mechanisms
  in\nlight of broader questions surrounding the role of corporations in\ns
 ociety and corporate governance. Questions of corporate liability\ncombine
 d with that of its directors and professional advisors has\nrevived the la
 te 19th to mid-20th century debate surrounding the\nstatus of corporations
 \, not only as subjects of rights but of\nobligations as well.\nOrganised 
 by 9IÖÆ×÷³§Ãâ·Ñ's\nCentre for Intellectual Property Policy and Univer
 sité de\nMontréal's Centre de recherche en droit public.\nDownload the pre
 sentation and the abstracts [.doc].\n
DTSTART:20110421T170000Z
DTEND:20110421T210000Z
LOCATION:Chancellor Day Hall\, CA\, QC\, Montreal\, H3A 1W9\, 3644 rue Peel
SUMMARY:3rd edition of the Competition and Innovation Colloquium Series - W
 hat Performance? From Economic Performance to Corporate Citizenship
URL:/channels/event/3rd-edition-competition-and-innova
 tion-colloquium-series-what-performance-economic-performance-corpo-171745
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